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PLUGGING OBLIGATIONS:

OPERATOR LIABILITY

TO STATE AND THIRD PARTIES
by
Professor Phillip E. Norvell
University of Arkansas School of Law (Fayetteville)

I.

The Problem of Unplugged Oil and Gas Wells
A.

Physical waste of oil, gas and coal reserves.
The failure to properly plug an abandoned oil or gas
well may result in actual physical waste of oil and gas
reserves because of the following: water may migrate
from the unplugged well to the producing formation and
"flood out" producing wells or force migration of oil
and gas into nonproductive areas; and, gas may
dissipate into the air from the wellhead, i.e.,
purging, which may reduce the reservoir pressure and
result in less than maximum ultimate recovery from the
reservoir.
See, Forbes v. United States, 125 F.2d 404
(9th Cir. 1942). Migration of oil, gas or water from
an unplugged well into coal seams may interfere with or
prevent mining of coal reserves. Mine shafts may be
flooded by salt water or invaded by migrating gas which
may result in injury to miners as well as physical
waste of coal reserves.

B.

Groundwater pollution.
Salt water originating in the unplugged well bore may
migrate up the hole and contaminate fresh water
formations.
Such salt water intrusion into fresh water
formations is typically a result of pressurization of
the formation penetrated by the unplugged well due to
salt water disposal or waterflood operations.

C.

Surface damage.
The purging of salt water or oil from the unplugged
well may damage the soil, crops, livestock and
improvements.
See, Annotation, Liability for Injury to
Property Occasioned by Oil, Water or the Like, Flowing
from Well, 19 A.L.R.2d 1025 (1951).
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D.

Personal injury.
Gas purging from an unplugged well may cause personal
injury. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Witcher. 141 Okla.
175, 284 P. 297 (1929). Toxic substances sometimes
found in oil and gas reserves, such as H2S, may result
in death.

II.

The Statutory Requirement to Plug Abandoned Wells
A.

B.

"Requirement that Dry or Abandoned Wells be Plugged,"
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-215 (1987), reads as follows:
1.

"Each abandoned well and each dry hole promptly
shall be plugged in the manner and within the time
required by regulations to be prescribed by the
commission. The owner of the well shall give
notice, upon a form the commission may prescribe,
of the drilling of each dry hole and of the
owner's intention to abandon."

2.

"No well shall be abandoned until the notice has
been given and no fee shall be required to be paid
with this notice."

"Plugging Dry or Abandoned Well by Another," Ark. Code
Ann. § 15-72-218 (1987), is a "self help" provision,
inter alia. which prescribes the following:
"Any person" injured or threatened with injury by the
failure of a well to be plugged in compliance with §
15-72-217, infra, may, after proper notice, enter upon
the premises, plug the well and recover the costs of
plugging, court costs and attorney's fees from the
person with the "duty to plug the well." The act also
impresses a lien upon the well equipment and leasehold
interest of the owner or operator of the well to ensure
recovery of the statutory damages.

C.

The method of plugging a "dry" or "abandoned" well in
which "oil or gas bearing stratum" has been found, to
be supervised by an "Oil and Gas Inspector" is
prescribed by Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-217 (1987),
"Plugging Dry or Abandoned Well by Lessee or Operator,"
which, in relevant part, reads as follows:
1.

Beginning at the bottom, the hole shall be solidly
plugged with a substance *** of one-third (1/3)
*** cement and two-thirds (2/3) *** of sand
properly mixed with water to a point twenty-five
2

feet (25') above top level of the oil or gas
bearing sand. At that point, a seasoned wooden
plug two feet (2') in length and the diameter of
the hole shall be placed. Thereafter the hole
shall be filled solidly with twenty-five (25') of
sand balings. Then a seasoned wooden plug two
feet (2') long, and the diameter of the hole shall
be placed and driven firmly into the sand balings.
2.

Should there be more than one (1) oil or gas
bearing sand *** after plugging the bottom sand in
the well *** the well shall be filled with sand
balings within ten feet (10') of the bottom of the
next sand *** when this sand and each succeeding
sand shall be plugged in the manner set out in
subdivision (1) *** until all of the oil and gas
bearing sands in the well have been plugged ***.

III. The Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission Regulations Governing
Well Plugging.
A.

Statutory basis for the Commission's jurisdiction.
1.

Rule making authority for well plugging.
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-71-110(c)(1)(A) (1987)
authorizes the Commission to promulgate reasonable
rules to, inter alia, require the plugging of
wells in a manner which avoids the migration of
oil or gas from one strata to another, the
intrusion of water into an oil or gas stratum, and
the pollution of freshwater supplies by oil, gas
or salt water.

2.

Bond requirement authority.
Ark. Code Ann § 15-71-110(c)(1)(B) (1987)
authorizes the Commission to promulgate rules that
require a bond to secure the plugging of each
"dry" or "abandoned" well.

B.

Well plugging regulations of the Commission.
1.

Duty to protect oil, gas and water.
Rule B-6 requires that before any well, or any
producing formation therein, shall be abandoned
the "owner or operator" shall use the "means,
methods and procedure (sic)" necessary to prevent
water encroachment in any oil or gas bearing
3

formation and to prevent waste or contamination to
any underground or surface water "suitable for
domestic or irrigation purposes."
2.

Notice of abandonment and Commission supervision
of the well plugging.
Rule B-7 requires that an "Application to Abandon"
be filed with the Commission for any well to be
abandoned that was drilled in "search of oil or
gas." The application specifies the time and
place of plugging. Upon receipt of the
application, the Commission is to issue a
"Plugging Permit" and send a representative to
supervise the operation.
Rule B-5 (5) requires the application to abandon
to be filed within 5 days of the actual completion
of the well, or within 5 days of the filing of the
requisite Well Completion Report. Rule B-7 also
requires the plugging operation to be performed
prior to the time the equipment used to drill the
well is released from the well site.
Rule B-9 requires an affidavit to be filed with
the Commission within five (5) days of the
completion of the plugging operation which
describes in "detail" the method used to plug the
well.

3.

"Plugging Methods and Procedure"

Rule B-8.

Rule B-8 specifies the manner in which the well
is to be plugged. Essentially, each producing
formation, and all water bearing strata, as well
as the surface hole, must be effectively sealed.
More specifically, Rule B-8 (A) requires filling
the bottom hole to the top of the deepest
producing formation, and placing a cement plug
(not less than 100' in length) or a bridge plug
inside the casing immediately above each producing
stratum. Section (B) requires that a cement plug
be placed inside the base of the surface casing
when such surface casing has been cemented below
the base of the freshwater formation as required
by Rule B-15. When surface casing has not been
cemented below the freshwater sands, a cement plug
must be placed approximately fifty feet (50')
below all such freshwater strata. Section (C)
requires the placing of a plug at the surface in
such a manner that it will not interfere with
4

cultivation. Section (D) requires that the
intervals between plugs be filled with an approved
heavy mud-laden fluid.
Section (E) provides that, in addition to the
surface plug, an uncased well drilled by a
rotary rig shall be plugged with a cement plug
placed immediately above the smackover limestone
zone, and any other known productive zone in the
area, with the hole filled with heavy mud up to
the base of the surface casing where a cement plug
is to be placed. However, if the surface casing
is not cemented through the base of the fresh
water stratum, a cement plug is to be placed fifty
feet (50') below the fresh water strata.
Finally, section (F) provides any method of
plugging other than the prescribed methods may be
used if approved by the Commission.
4.

Permit and bonding requirements for casing pullers
and salvage operators.
Rule B-12 requires a permit and a $5000 surety
bond for anyone engaged in pulling casing for
compensation or purchasing abandoned wells with
the intent to salvage the casing.
Failure to
plug a well from which the casing has been pulled
without compliance with the well plugging rules
results in the forfeiture of the bond. The permit
may be issued for a term of not less than one (1)
year, nor more than three (3) years, with the bond
being co-extensive with the term. The permit is
also non-transferable. A willful violation of
Rule B-12 incurs a penalty not to exceed $1000 a
day for each day of violation.

IV.

Securing Statutory Compliance: The Affidavit of Financial
Responsibility, Surety Bond and Civil Penalties
A.

Proof of financial responsibility.
Rule B-2 requires an applicant for a drilling permit to
submit an affidavit of financial responsibility,
subscribed under oath, stating that the applicant owns
within the State of Arkansas assets in excess of
liabilities sufficient to enable compliance with the
surface owner damage protection act, Ark. Code Ann. §
15-72-213 (1987), (being more commonly known as Act 902
of 1983).
5

The surface owner protection act, inter alia, impresses
a lien on the well equipment and production runs of the
operator to secure payment of damages for surface
injury occasioned by operator neglect. The surface
owner must give written notice to the Commission of the
surface damage claim within one (1) year of the
issuance of the drilling permit. The surface owner's
lien is also expressly subordinated to the right of the
Commission to secure compliance with the well plugging
act, Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987), under the proof
of financial responsibility.
B.

The surety bond or letter of credit.
I n lieu of the affidavit of financial responsibility,
Rule B-2 permits the applicant for a drilling permit to
post a surety bond or an irrevocable letter of credit
in the sum of $15,000 to ensure compliance with the
surface owner protection act, Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72213 (1987). The bond or letter of credit remains in
effect until the requirements of the surface owner
protection act have been satisfied. Typically, if
surface owner claims are not filed within the requisite
one (1) year period, the surety bond or letter of
credit is canceled by the Director of Production and
Conservation and the operator then furnishes the
affidavit of financial responsibility.

C.

Assumption of liability by successor operator.
Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-204 (1987) and,
also, Rule B-2(a), proof of financial responsibility is
only required as a condition to the issuance of the
drilling permit. Thus, the operator who acquires an
existing well by assignment is not required to furnish
proof of financial responsibility. Legislation has
been proposed in this legislative session to amend Ark.
Code Ann. § 15-72-213 to require a successor operator
of any existing well to furnish proof of financial
responsibility.

D.

Bonding of pre-existing wells: wells drilled prior to
the bonding requirement.
The Arkansas Oil and Gas Conservation Act, (commonly
referred to as Act 105 of 1939), which authorized the
newly created Oil and Gas Commission to promulgate
rules governing well plugging, including a bonding
provision, Arkansas Acts 105 of 1939, Sec. 11, was
enacted in 1939. Presumably, some wells drilled prior
6

to that date are still in operation. The operator of
any such "pre-existing well" is not required to furnish
proof of financial responsibility. Thus, "pre-existing
wells," destined only to be abandoned, will remain free
of the proof of financial responsibility requirements,
denying the state the benefit of the security to
facilitate proper plugging. In contrast, the Illinois
Oil and Gas Act, 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 96 1/2 para. 5409,
by amendment, 1945 111. Laws para. 1091, § 1, requires
"each manager or operator who has acquired or may
hereafter acquire any well drilled for these purposes
which has not theretofore been plugged and abandoned"
to post the usual proof of financial responsibility.
E.

V.

Civil penalties.
1.

A fine of not less than $100 nor more than $1000
for any violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-217
(1987), "Plugging Dry or Abandoned Well by Lessee
or Operator." Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-202(a)(1)
(1987).

2.

A fine of not more than $2500 a day for each
violation may be incurred for violation of any
Commission rule, including rule B-8, infra, which
prescribes the method of plugging abandoned wells.
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-103(a) (1987).

The Liability of the Operator to the State
A.

Liability on the requisite security.
1.

The affidavit of financial responsibility.
Most state conservation statutes require
performance bonds as the sole method of securing
compliance with the well plugging obligation.
Thus, no reported case has been found which
analyzes the rights of the conservation agency
pursuing the assets of an operator pursuant to the
affidavit of financial responsibility for failure
to comply with the plugging operation.
The surety bond cases, discussed below at V (A)
(2) et seq., may indicate a willingness of the
courts to liberally construe the rights, if any,
of the agency pursuant to the affidavit of
financial responsibility.

2.

The state is not required to prove damage in a
suit on the bond.
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In People ex re. Schull v. Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co.. 4 I11.2d 23, 122 N.E.2d 185, 4 0. &.
G.R. 126 (1954), the defendant surety executed a
bond which was conditioned upon the principal
complying with the oil and gas conservation act,
which required restoration of the well site to its
pre-drilling condition. The principal failed to
restore the surface and the Department of Mines
and Minerals (department) sued the defendant
surety on the bond. After the complaint was
filed, the defendant, at its own expense, had the
surface restored to the satisfaction of the
department. The defendant then argued that the
department could not recover on the bond in the
absence of any injury occasioned by the breach of
the condition of the bond. The trial court
rejected the defendant's argument and entered
judgment for the Department for the full amount of
the bond. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's judgment on appeal, holding that the
bond was a "penalty bond," intended to secure
compliance with the law, as opposed to an
"indemnity bond," intended to indemnify the state
for damages sustained due to the violation of the
statute. The court observed that to construe the
bond as an "indemnity bond," i.e., limiting the
surety's obligation to actual damages sustained by
the public body, would frustrate the statutory
purpose and reduce the requirement of a bond to an
"empty formality." Contra State v. Alpha Oil &
Gas, Inc.. 747 S.W.2d 378 (Tx. 1988).
3.

Operator's liability to surety for the amount of
the bond in the event of forfeiture.
The contract of indemnity provides that the
principal, the operator, will indemnify the surety
for any losses sustained by the latter when the
bond is forfeited due to the failure of the former
to comply with the statute.
See generally, State
v. Duchscherer. 35 A.D.2d 7, 312 N.Y.S.2d 45, 36
0. & G.R. 79 (1970).

B.

Right of conservation agency to plug the well and sue
the operator for the costs.
Some oil and gas conservation acts provide that the
state may enter the land and plug the well and charge
the costs to the operator. Section 75 (1)(C) of the
New York Conservation Act provides as follows:
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*** the department shall have the power to: (K)
Enter, take temporary possession of any abandoned
well, and plug the same as provided in its
plugging rules and regulations, whenever any
operator shall neglect or refuse to comply with
such rules and regulations. Such plugging by the
department shall be at the expense of the operator
whose duty it shall be to plug the well.
For application of the statute, see generally, State v.
Duchscherer. 35 A.D.2d 7, 312 N.Y. S.2d 45, 36 0. &.
G.R. 79 (1970).
C.

Right of the state to compel the operator to replug an
improperly plugged well.
Although the Arkansas plugging act and Commission
regulations do not specifically provide that the
Commission may compel the operator to replug an
improperly plugged well, authority for that
proposition exists. In Currey v. Corporation Comm'n,
617 P .2d 177, 68 0. &. G.R. 274 (Okla. 1979), two wells
which had been abandoned and plugged by the operator,
the defendant, in the mid-1950's were discovered twenty
(20) years later to be purging salt water onto the
surface at the rate of forty (40) barrels per day.
The Corporation Commission determined that the wells
had been improperly plugged and ordered the defendant
to replug the wells. Although the Oklahoma well
plugging statute did not specifically authorize the
Commission to compel the operator to subsequently
replug an improperly plugged well, the court, relying
upon an amendment establishing the "orphan" well
plugging fund which made reference to "replugging or
repairing the well *** to prevent further pollution,"
held that the Commission had such authority.
Subsequently, in Ashland Oil. Inc, v. Corporation
Comm'n . 595 P. 2d 423, 63 0. &. G.R. 331 (Okla. 1979),
the operator plugged two wells in 1946 and 1959,
respectively, in violation of the Commission's rules to
protect groundwater by failing to set a cement plug
below the fresh water strata. However, the Commission's
inspectors who supervised the plugging of the wells had
approved the defendant's plugging procedure.
Thereafter, in the 1970's, the wells were purging salt
water and polluting a freshwater formation which was
used for a domestic water supply. The court affirmed
an order of the Commission requiring the defendant to
replug the wells. In so doing, the court concluded
that the Commission had no authority to waive the
applicable regulations and, thus, was not bound by the
ultra vires action of their employees. Likewise, the
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Commission was not estopped from requiring replugging
of the wells in compliance with the rules. Finally,
the failure to have yet ordered other operators in the
area with identically plugged wells to replug their
wells did not render the Commission's order arbitrary
and unenforceable.
D.

Liability to the state is incurred when environmental
harm or physical waste of minerals occurs even though
the operator has complied with the well plugging act.
In State v. Duchscherer. 35 A.D.2d 7, 312 N.Y.S.2d 45,
36 O. &. G.R. 79 (1970), the defendant operator plugged
and abandoned several unprofitable wells. After the
initial plugging efforts, three (3) of the wells
continued to purge gas. After making several
unsuccessful attempts to seal the leaks by replugging
the wells, the defendant "gave up, " declining to
undertake any more replugging efforts. The wells
continued to leak gas. Pursuant to the statute, Sec.
75 (C) of the Conservation Act, the Conservation
Department engaged a contractor who replugged the wells
and then sued the defendant to recover the costs. In
the suit, the defendant argued, inter alia. that,
following accepted procedures, he had plugged and
subsequently replugged the wells in strict compliance
with the Department's regulations and, thus, had
fulfilled his responsibility under the plugging act.
The Court of Appeals, affirming the lower court's
judgment for the Department, rejected the defendant's
defense, holding that the defendant's responsibility
under the statute was not merely to follow the
Department's regulations but to plug the well to
prevent the escape of gas. The court emphasized the
plugging statute, i.e., "the legislative safeguard
against environmental pollution and destructive and
dangerous gas blowouts and fires," m u s t be strictly
enforced.

VI.

Liability of the Operator to Third Parties
A.

Violation of the well plugging acts.
1.

Abandonment of the well.
The Arkansas Well Plugging Act, Ark. Code Ann. §
15-72-216(a) (1987), requires each "abandoned
well" and "dry hole" to be plugged pursuant to
Rule B-6 after notice of the intent to abandon,
which is a condition precedent to abandonment, is
given to the Commission. However, neither the
statutes, nor the rules of the Commission define
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an "abandoned well." The problem of definition is
generally encountered when a well is non
producing, or incapable of being completed as a
producing well, but the operator refuses to plug
the well, alleging that it has not been
"abandoned," b u t only ostensibly "temporarily
shut-in" or "awaiting other completion efforts."
Seaboard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth. 237 S.W. 48 (Ky.
Ct. Ap. 1922), is the leading case on abandonment.
There the defendant was fined $300 in the Circuit
Court for failure to comply with the Kentucky Well
Plugging Act, a predecessor statute to Ky. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 353.180. The evidence indicated that
the defendant operator had drilled a well on the
lease premises which showed a meager trace of oil
in the well bore. The defendant did not then test
the well's productivity by pumping but delayed the
test until other wells projected to be drilled on
the lease in the future could be tested.
Apparently, the defendant was motivated to run the
pumping test at the same time on all the wells to
be drilled on the premises so that the same power
source could be utilized. However, the defendant
was waiting on the results of other wells being
drilled on adjacent tracts before deciding whether
to further drill, or, if so, where to drill on the
lease premises.
In any event, the defendant did
not complete the well as a producer or pull the
casing. Also, the defendant moved the drilling
rig from the lease. On appeal of the fine, the
defendant argued, inter alia, that the failure to
pull the casing precluded a finding of abandonment
of the well, which was a prerequisite to
imposition of the fine. The court affirmed the
conviction. In so doing, it adopted an objective
standard of abandonment, i.e., evidence of an act
of abandonment with the intention to abandon,
inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
events, including the conduct of the parties,
regardless of the claimed mental intent of the
operator. The court also noted that abandonment
was a question of fact for the jury. Further, the
court opined that pulling the casing would
constitute ipso facto abandonment, i.e.,
abandonment as a matter of law.
Applying
i.e., an
question
judicial

the common law standard of abandonment,
act plus intent of abandonment, as a
of fact to be determined by the jury in a
proceeding, is an inefficient, haphazard
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manner of enforcing the proper plugging of dry
holes and depleted or uneconomic oil and gas
wells. Administratively determined criteria which
specifically delineates the circumstances under
which nonproducing wells may be temporarily shutin or permanently plugged provides the operator
with more certainty as to its rights and
obligations and provides the public with more
protection of natural resources and the
environment.
Some conservation acts do definitively define
"abandoned well" for purposes of the well plugging
acts and agency regulations. For example, Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.510 (12) defines "abandoned
well" as one which has "never been used, or which,
in the opinion of the department (conservation
agency), will no longer be used for the production
of oil or gas, or for the injection or disposal of
fluid therein."
2.

Failure to comply with the well plugging acts is
negligence per se.
In Nisbet v. Van Tuy l 224 F.2d 66, 51 0. &. G.R.
15 (7th. Cir. 1955), the defendant, the assignee
of the lessee of the oil and gas lease, drilled a
dry hole through a workable coal seam. The
defendant allegedly failed to properly plug the
well pursuant to the Kentucky well plugging act,
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.120. Subsequently, the
plaintiff, the lessor, executed a coal lease on
the land to the West Kentucky Coal Company. When
the coal company started mining the coal, water
and gas from the abandoned well leaked into the
mine, halting the mining operations.
Plaintiffs,
at a cost of $7500, properly replugged the
abandoned well so that the coal mining operations
could be resumed. Then, alleging negligence in
the failure to properly plug the abandoned well
pursuant to the statute, plaintiffs sued the
defendant to recover the replugging costs. In
reversing the trial court’s granting of summary
judgment to the defendant, the Circuit Court of
Appeals held, inter alia, that violation of the
statute was "negligence per se.” Thus, to
recover, plaintiff needed to prove only that the
defendant's violation of the statute was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's damage.
Additionally, the court held that the Kentucky
statute, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 353.990, providing
12

criminal and civil penalties for violation of the
act, did not preclude the existence of the private
cause of action for violation of the statute.
3.

Proximate cause of injury may be established by
circumstantial evidence.
In Palmer Corp. v. Collins. 284 S.W. 97 (Ky.
1926), plaintiff owned an oil and gas lease
adjacent to the defendant's lease. The defendant
abandoned, without plugging, two wells on his
lease in conformity with the well plugging act.
Immediately thereafter, plaintiff, whose wells had
not previously produced water, discovered water in
his battery tanks. Plaintiff examined the
defendant's two unplugged wells and discovered
that they were "open and full of water."
Plaintiff informed the defendant who agreed to
plug the wells but was prevented from doing so for
two (2) months due to lack of equipment. After
the defendant's wells were properly plugged and
the water had been removed from the wells, the
water did not reappear in plaintiff's wells.
Plaintiff sued the defendant for the costs of
removing the water from his wells. The Court of
Appeals sustained the trial court's judgment in
favor of plaintiff. In so doing, the court held,
inter alia, that direct proof that the water in
the plaintiff's wells was due to the defendant's
failure to properly plug his well was not
required.
The fact that the plaintiff had no
trouble with water in his wells prior to the
defendant's failure to properly plug his abandoned
wells, and when the defendant's wells were
properly plugged and the water was removed from
plaintiff's wells, the water did not return was
sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict for the
plaintiff.
In McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 233 Kan.
252, 662 P .2d 1203, 77 O . & G.R. 241 (1983), the
following circumstantial evidence was found
sufficient to avoid summary judgment for the
defendant oil companies and to go to the jury on
the issue of liability for groundwater pollution
pursuant to a statute imposing liability for
damages incurred by escape of salt water in oil
and gas operations: evidence that a water well on
plaintiff's land produced good water when he
purchased the tract in 1967; that subsequent water
well drilled in 1970 developed "extremely high
chloride and salt content" and was unfit for use
13

in 1974; various witnesses' testimony that
numerous salt water disposal pits existed and that
salt water surface spills, oil tank and pipeline
leaks were prevalent in oil company operations in
the geographic area; and, expert witnesses,
including a hydrologist, who testified that
plaintiff's well appeared to be polluted by oil
field brine. None of the witnesses testified as
to any act of the defendants which caused the
pollution of the plaintiff's well; no evidence of
direct causal connection was introduced.
4.

The well plugging act protects landowners,
adjacent landowners and mining operators.
The general well plugging act in Arkansas, Ark.
Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987), does not expressly
impose liability in favor of a party who suffers
harm attributable to a violation of the act. Ark.
Code Ann. § 15-72-218 (1987) permits "any person
injured or threatened with injury" the remedy of
self-help, i.e., the right to plug the well and
recover the costs of plugging, as well as court
costs and attorney fees, from the "person whose
duty it was to plug the well." However, the
limitation on liability in § 15-72-216, as well as
the limitation on damages in § 15-72-218 appears
to be inconsequential. In addition to holding that
violation of the statute constitutes negligence
per se. Nisbet v. Van Tuyl . supra, the courts have
extended protection of the well plugging act to
landowners and adjacent landowners and oil and gas
or mining operators who have been damaged by the
defendant's failure to properly plug an abandoned
well. Likewise, damages are awarded for all
pecuniary losses proximately caused by the
defendant's failure to properly plug the well.
The following cases illustrate the scope of
protection of the well plugging acts and the
damages which may be awarded pursuant thereto:

a.

Groundwater pollution or surface damage.
Hall v. Galey , 2 7 1 P. 319 (Kan. 1928),
illustrates, in part, the traditional theory
of damages for groundwater pollution. There,
the defendant operator negligently plugged an
abandoned gas well in violation of the Kansas
14

well plugging act. As a result, subsurface
salt water polluted a water well on land
situated adjacent to the well. Plaintiff,
the landowner, recovered the diminution in
the market value of the land due to the
"permanent" harm occasioned to the
groundwater, the only source of potable water
on the tract. If the harm to the groundwater
is remedial or abatable, the damage may be
classified as "temporary" which limits the
recovery to the rental value of the land for
the period in which it was incapable of use
or the cost of restoring the groundwater.
See, Dobbs, Remedies § 5.1 (West 1973).
Maxedon v. Texaco Producing. Inc., 710 F.
Supp. 1306 (W.D. Kan. 1989), illustrates
that the traditional theory of damages for
groundwater pollution may be changing due to
the prevalent environmental ethic. There,
plaintiff landowners filed suit against the
defendant oil and gas lease operator for
pollution of their land caused by saltwater
leaking from improperly plugged and abandoned
wells and saltwater spills. On the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court initially held that the plaintiffs
could not recover the cost of cleaning up the
land when that amount exceeds the fair market
value of the property before injury. Even
though the court evidenced concern about
pollution caused by oil and gas operations,
as well as the public policy of requiring
restoration of polluted land and water, the
court refused to "legislate" and change the
common law rule that damages cannot exceed
the fair market value of the land before
injury. Later, however, the court retracted
that part of its opinion which held that
temporary damages may not exceed the pre
injury value of the damaged property. The
court noted that the 10th Circuit in Miller
v. Cudahy Co.. 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir.
1988), affirmed an award of temporary damages
which exceeded the potential recovery for
permanent damages, i.e., the difference in
the fair market value of the land before and
after the injury. The award in Cudahy had
calculated temporary damages as the loss of
the value of the use of the property. The
court noted its disagreement with that result
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but indicated that it was compelled to follow
Cudahy and stated that if "temporary
damages," i.e., damages for an injury that is
"intermittent and occasional (when) the cause
of damages (is) remediable, removable, or
abatable," should be awarded at trial, the
evidence may justify an award which would
exceed the value of the land prior to the
injury.
The damages for injury to the land is
essentially the same as for groundwater
pollution.
b.

Physical waste of oil, gas, or coal reserves.
Veazey v. Burton Indus., Inc., 407 So.2d 59,
72 O &. G.R. 60 (La. App. 1981), involved a
suit by a mineral owner against the operator
to recover the value of petroleum
hydrocarbons which were allegedly wasted from
the leased premises due to the operator's
negligent failure to properly plug an
abandoned well. The facts indicate that
plaintiff, the mineral owner, executed an oil
and gas lease which was subsequently assigned
to the defendant operator who drilled, in
1966, an 18,000 foot well on the premises.
Allegedly, two high-pressure gas zones were
encountered, as indicated by the well logs,
at 14,675 feet and 14,800 feet respectively,
which was below the point at which the
defendant set casing, at 13,429 feet. As
opposed to completing the well, the defendant
abandoned and plugged the well. In plugging
the well, defendant negligently failed to
isolate and separately plug the gas zones as
required for all "open reservoirs" of oil or
gas by the applicable Louisiana well plugging
regulations. Thereafter, the well logs were
discovered by another operator who obtained
an oil and gas lease from the plaintiff and
drilled, in 1977, a dry hole on the premises.
Plaintiff then sued the defendant for the
value of the gas and condensate allegedly
wasted from the gas reservoirs due to the
negligent failure to properly plug the well.
The trial court granted summary judgment to
the defendant, which was affirmed by the
Louisiana Appellate Court on the ground that
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the plaintiff's alleged damages were
"speculative."
To recover, the court held,
plaintiff must prove with certainty that the
oil and gas could have been produced in 1966
from the alleged reservoirs, and that it was
then economically feasible for the defendant
operator to have done so. Likewise, the
quantity of oil and gas which would have been
produced and the value of the production to
the plaintiff must be proved with certainty.
Mr. Justice Laborde dissented. Cf. Elliff v.
Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W. 2d
558 (1948).
c.

Costs of properly plugging abandoned wells
recovered by subsequent operator.
In Salmon Corp. v. Forest Oil Corp ., 536 P.2d
909, 52 O &. G.R. 413 (1974), the defendant
operated seventy-one (71) oil wells producing
from the Wayside sand in Osage County, Ok.
When primary production declined, the
defendant plugged the wells. Approximately
four (4) years later, plaintiff obtained oil
and gas leases on the land, and other lands,
and instituted a secondary recovery
waterflood operation. When the plaintiff,
pursuant to his secondary recovery operation,
injected water under pressure in the
formation, an old well previously plugged by
the defendant immediately commenced to purge
water. Plaintiff re-entered and replugged
the well. Plaintiff alleged that twenty-five
(25) of the old wells plugged by the
defendant were negligently or improperly
plugged and adversely interfered with the
waterflood operation and polluted the land.
However, since it was impossible to establish
if the remaining forty-six (46) wells were
plugged in such a manner as to withstand the
pressure from the injected water, plaintiff
plugged or replugged all of the wells
previously operated by the defendant.
Thereafter, plaintiff sued the defendant to
recover the costs of plugging the wells. The
defendant argued, inter alia, that the
Oklahoma Well Plugging Act, Corporation
Commission Act and Osage Indian Agency
regulations did not require the wells to be
plugged so as to avoid interference with
future waterflood operations. By summary
judgment, plaintiff was denied the right to
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recover the costs of plugging the forty-six
(46) wells which were not alleged to have
been improperly plugged. Further, the trial
court instructed the jury, inter alia, that
"substantial compliance" with the well
plugging statutes and Osage Indian
regulations was the extent of the defendant's
duty and such a finding would preclude a
verdict for the plaintiff. The jury found
for the defendant. On appeal, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
for retrial. First, the court held that
plaintiff would be entitled to recover the
costs of plugging the allegedly improperly
plugged wells if the defendant had failed to
"strictly comply" with the applicable well
plugging regulations and, additionally, if
plugging the wells in compliance with the
regulations would have "sealed off" the
formation so that the plugged wells would
have withstood the enhanced pressure
occasioned by the waterflooding. Further,
plaintiff would also be entitled to recover
the plugging costs of the wells which had not
been alleged to have been improperly plugged
if a "reasonable prudent operator," under
the circumstances, would have reentered and
replugged the wells before continuing with
the waterflood operation.
d.

Cost of restoring the damaged formation.
See, Palmer Corp . v. Collins, supra, at
VI(A) (3).

e.

Punitive damages.
In Nichols v. Burk Royalty Co.. 576 P.2d 317,
60 O &. G.R. 546 (Okla. App. 1977),
plaintiff's land was polluted during a ten
(10) year period by saltwater leaking and
overflowing from pipelines and holding tanks.
In addition to compensatory damages,
plaintiff was awarded punitive damages in his
suit. In affirming the punitive damages award
on appeal, the Oklahoma intermediate
appellate court emphasized that the
defendants were aware of the poor condition
of the tanks and pipes, since they continued
to repair the leaks, and preferred to make
post-spill repair rather than pre-pollution
replacement of the dilapidated equipment.
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Such conduct evidenced a reckless and
aggravating disregard for the rights of
plaintiff and indifference regarding the
fertility of the soil, justifying an award of
punitive damages.
The impetus to avoid punitive damages in
groundwater pollution litigation is
illustrated by Marshall v. El Paso Natural
Gas Co.. 874 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1989), an
action involving the failure to properly plug
an abandoned oil and gas well, wherein a jury
verdict for $400,050 in compensatory damages
and $5 million in punitive damages was
affirmed on appeal.
5.

Liability of operator who "abandons" the well, or
subsequent assignee or mineral owner.
a.

Liability is imposed on an operator who
abandons the well.
Although the language of the statute
expressly refers to the "owner of the well,"
who is required to give notice of the intent
to abandon the well and, thus, by implication
would seem to have the duty to plug the well,
Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987) may be
construed as placing the obligation to plug
the well on the "operator" who abandons the
well. Because the operator is traditionally
the party who obtains the drilling permit and
posts the proof of financial responsibility
pursuant to Rule B-7 to ensure the plugging
of the well, the Commission's rules would
also seem to indicate that the operator is
the party responsible for the plugging of the
well. Should this construction prevail,
neither successors-in-interest of the
operator who abandons the well, nor owners of
non-operating working interests, would incur
liability to the state or third parties for
failure to plug a previously abandoned well.
Some support for that proposition exists. In
Railroad Comm'n v. American Petrofina Co.,
576 S .W. 2d 658, 62 O & G.R. 421 (Tex. Civ.
Ap. 1978), the defendant acquired by
assignment an oil and gas lease upon which
was situated a producing gas well. Also
situated upon the leased premises was an
19

unplugged well which had been drilled under a
previously terminated oil and gas lease. The
well had been abandoned prior to the
defendant's acquisition of its assignment.
The then applicable Texas Well Plugging Act,
Tex. Nat. Resources Code Ann. § 89.002(A)(2)
(1978), imposed the obligation to plug the
well on the "operator," defined as "a person
who is responsible for physical operation and
control of a well at the time the well is
about to be abandoned or ceases operation."
The Texas Railroad Commission ordered the
defendant to plug the abandoned well. The
trial court reversed the Order of the
Railroad Commission. In affirming the trial
court's judgment, the Court of Civil Appeals
emphasized that the defendant, not having
abandoned the well, was not the "operator"
pursuant to the statute.
b.

Liability is imposed on subsequent assignee.
Houser v. Brown. 29 Ohio. App. 3d 358, 505
N .E .2d 1021, 94 O &. G.R. 344 (1986),
involved a construction of the Ohio Well
Plugging Act, R.C. 1509.01(K), which provides
that "the owner," i.e., "the person who has
the right to drill *** and to appropriate the
oil or gas that he produces *** is the person
responsible for plugging a well that is or
becomes incapable of producing oil or gas in
commercial quantities." There, the inspector
of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources
discovered five (5) nonproducing unplugged
wells on land owned by Sharon Herold during
an "on site" inspection. The evidence
indicated that the wells had not produced
since 1973 and from that time the Department
had been aware of their "dormant" condition.
At the time of the "on site" inspection, the
leases were then owned by the defendant Brown
who had acquired the leases by assignment in
1979. The Chief of the Division of Oil and
Gas (Chief) ordered Brown to plug the wells.
However, Brown had already released his
interest in the leases to the landowner
Herold. When the Chief found out that Brown
had already cancelled his leases, he ordered
Herold, the landowner, to plug the wells.
Both Brown and Herold appealed the orders to
the Board of Review who reversed the order as
to Brown, finding that he was not the "owner"
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when the Chief found the wells were incapable
of producing, and affirmed the order as to
Herold, finding that she was the "owner" when
the wells were found to be incapable of
producing. The decision reversing the order
as to Brown was appealed to the Court of
Common Pleas which affirmed the Board's
reversal of the Brown order on the grounds
that the "owner" of the wells for purposes of
the Well Plugging Act was the "owner" at the
time of the issuance of the Order to plug.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.
Brown, the assignee to the nonproducing wells
in 1979 had a duty, pursuant to the statute,
to plug the wells. Thus, a new lessee or new
owner may "inherit" the duty to plug a well
if a well incapable of producing in
commercial quantities is leased. The court
noted that language of the statute, the
policy requiring the plugging of unproductive
wells, and the realities of the oil business
justify this result. Many wells, the court
noted, were drilled at the turn of the
century, and many of the companies who
drilled these wells are now out of business;
thus, holding only the original owner
responsible for the plugging of the wells
would defeat the purpose of the statute.
Further, the obligation to plug the well was
a continuing duty, and once Brown acquired
the duty, he could not escape it by releasing
the leases prior to the issuance of the order
to plug the wells.
c.

Liability of nonoperating working interest
owner.
In 1983, the Texas Well Plugging Act was
amended to provide that in the event the
operator could not be found or no longer was
in existence or lacked the assets to properly
plug the well, the nonoperator, defined as
working interest owners, exclusive of royalty
and overriding royalty interests, had the
duty to plug the well.
In Railroad Comm'n v.
Olin Corp ., 690 S.W.2d 628, 88 0. &. G.R. 579
(Tex. App. 1985) a working interest owner,
pursuant to a joint operating agreement,
elected to go "non-consent," i.e., to be
"carried" with a right to receive their
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proportionate share of production after costs
plus a risk factor penalty had been recovered
from their share of production, to a proposal
by the operator to rework the well.
Subsequently, the operator, unsuccessful in
his reworking efforts, failed to plug the
well. When the operator could not be
located, or lacked the assets to plug the
well, the nonoperating working interest owner
was held to be obligated to plug the well.
d.

Liability of the mineral owner.
In Houser v. Brown, supra, Chief of the
Division of Oil and Gas (Chief) ordered the
landowner, apparently the mineral owner,
pursuant to the Ohio Well Plugging Act, to
plug the abandoned and unplugged wells. For
a recitation of the facts, including the
statute, see VI(A)(5)(b). On Appeal, the
Board of Review affirmed the Chief's Order,
finding that the mineral owner was the
"owner" when the wells were found to be
incapable of producing. The mineral owner
failed to appeal the decision of the Board of
Review. On the ultimate appeal of the
Chief's Order to Brown, the assignee of the
lessee who abandoned the wells without
plugging, who had also been ordered to plug
the wells, the Ohio Court of Appeals noted
that the Chief had correctly issued the order
to plug the wells to the mineral owner who,
according to the court, also had a statutory
duty to the public to plug the wells.

B.

Common law remedies.
For a discussion of the common law remedies of
trespass, negligence, nuisance and the doctrine of
correlative rights, see, Douglass, The Obligation of
Lessees and Others to Plug and Abandon Oil and Gas
Wells, 25th Oil & Gas Inst. 123 (Matthew Bender 1974).

VI.

The "Orphan Well" Problem and the "Well Plugging Fund"
A.

Orphan wells are wells which have or will be abandoned
without being plugged.1
1.

The United States currently has 452,589 "stripper
wells," i.e., "wells producing ten (10) barrels or
less of oil a day." Interstate Oil Compact
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Commission, National Stripper Well Survey 4
(1990). Many of these wells are unbonded, and may
be abandoned in the future by operators lacking
assets to plug. Arkansas has 7,428 stripper wells
which average 2.42 BPD. National Stripper Well
Survey, supra. at 4.
2.

Thousands of previously abandoned and unplugged
wells exist in the oil and gas producing regions
of the United States. Most of the unplugged wells
appear to be a legacy of the era of unregulated
production of oil and gas. Today's comprehensive
regulation typically involves "cradle to the
grave" regulation of oil and gas wells, i.e., from
permitting the drilling to requiring the plugging
of the well, with a bond required as a condition
to the issuance of the drilling permit to secure
the eventual plugging of the well. Drilling
permits, plugging permits and the bonding
requirements typically were adopted as a part of
the general conservation acts which regulated well
spacing and pooling. Prior to the adoption of the
general conservation acts, well plugging acts,
such as Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-216 (1987), merely
provided a cause of action for third parties
harmed by the failure to properly plug the well.
The statute failed to authorize the state to
enforce the Act. As a result, many wells were not
plugged when abandoned.

3.

The statutory solution: the well plugging fund.
One common solution has been a "well plugging
fund" which receives monies, either from
forfeiture of bonds or fines, or from legislative
appropriations which are available to the
conservation agency for the plugging of any
abandoned wells. Arkansas receives an
appropriation, currently amounting to $100,000,
from the legislature for funding of its well
plugging fund. The plugging of any such well by
the Commission should not relieve the operator of
any civil liability pursuant to § 15-72-216.

B.

Managing the orphan well problem.
1.

Problems associated with orphan wells.
Location of old abandoned and unplugged oil and
gas wells is a primary problem. No state records
of well locations existed during the pre
conservation act era. As to wells drilled before
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the 1950's, individuals with knowledge of the
unplugged well may no longer be living. The vast
number of orphan wells and the costs required to
plug old unplugged wells indicate that the state
cannot afford to plug all the existing unplugged
wells. The costs of plugging older unplugged
wells may exceed the costs of plugging presently
abandoned wells because some wells will have to be
re-drilled in order to be properly plugged.
Appropriations of funds from the legislature
sufficient to plug all of the orphan wells which
may pose a problem is unlikely to happen.
2.

A strategy for orphan wells.
Locating orphan wells which have the highest
potential for groundwater pollution would seem to
maximize the benefit of the limited funds
available to be expended on plugging orphan wells.
First, searches for unplugged wells should be
limited to geographic areas where groundwater is
the principal source, or potentially the principal
source, of water for domestic use. Additionally,
the extent of oil field operations conducted in
the area should also be a factor, as well as the
existence of salt water disposal or secondary
recovery operations, and any evidence of
pollution, such as surface damages or enhanced
mineralization of fresh water.

VIII.

State Regulation of Salt Water Disposal Wells and
Enhanced Oil Recovery Wells: The Safe Water Drinking
Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300(F) et seq. (West 1982)
A.

The statutory basis for the state regulation of Class
II wells (salt water disposal and enhanced oil recovery
wells).
1.

Pursuant to § 300 h-1, a state may obtain primary
enforcement responsibility of the "underground
injection control program" by obtaining approval
of a state administered program which meets the
EPA mandated "minimum requirements for effective
programs" to prevent underground injection of
fluids which "may result in the presence in
underground water which supplies or can reasonably
be expected to supply any public water system" of
any contaminant which may result in a violation of
the "national primary drinking water regulations"
or may "otherwise adversely affect the health of
persons." § 300h(d)(1,2). Arkansas has obtained
"primacy" and, thus, administers the state's
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"underground injection control program" applicable
to Class II wells.
2.

B.

Section § 300h-l(c)(1,2) exempts from the mandated
Underground Injection Control Program oil and gas
salt water disposal wells and enhanced recovery
wells "unless *** essential to assure that
underground sources of drinking water will not be
endangered by such injection."

Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission regulations applicable
to Class II wells, Rule C-7, Rule C-8 and Rule C-9.
1.

Plugging and abandoning regulations.
The method of plugging prescribed by Rule B-8 is
applicable to salt water disposal wells, pursuant
to Rule C-7(E)(4); fluid repressure and waterflood
wells, pursuant to Rule C-8(D)(3); and, gas
repressure wells, pursuant to Rule C-9(D)(3).

2.

Permitting requirements for Class II wells
relating to "orphan wells."
Applicants for class II wells must identify the
location of all "oil and gas wells including
abandoned and drilling wells and dry holes" within
one-half (1/2) mile of the location of the
injection well. All such wells which were
improperly plugged or abandoned may require a plan
of corrective action to prevent drinking water
contamination. If the corrective action plan is
deemed inadequate, the Commission may require
either revision or substitution of another plan,
or deny the permit. See, Rule C-7(D)(2)(a)(b), as
to salt water disposal wells; Rule C-8(C)(2)(b),
as to fluid repressure and waterflood wells; and,
Rule C-9(C)(2), as to gas repressure wells.

3.

Proof of financial responsibility.
Applicants for class II wells must satisfy the
Commission of their financial responsibility to
plug the well as a condition to issuance of the
permit.
In lieu of evidence of financial
responsibility, the applicant may post a $100,000
surety bond. See, Rule C-7(A)(3), as to salt
water disposal wells; Rule C-8(C)(2)(k), as to
fluid repressure and waterflood wells; and, Rule
C-9(C)(2)(k), as to gas repressure wells.
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C.

Civil and criminal penalties for violation of the
regulations.
1.

Civil penalties.
A fine of not more than $2500 a day for each
violation may be incurred for violation of any
Commission rule, including rule B-8, infra, which
prescribes the method of plugging abandoned wells
for class II wells. Ark. Code Ann. § 15-72-103(a)
(1987).

2.

Criminal penalties.
Imprisonment for not more than six (6) months, or
a fine of not more than $5000, or both, in lieu of
the civil penalty, shall be imposed for a
"willful" evasion or violation of any requirement
of the Safe Water Drinking Act. Ark. Code Ann. §
15-72-104 (1987).
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